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IS THE ORDINARY CONSUMER
LEFT WITH A DAMAGED
PRODUCT AND NO REMEDY?
Sharp Brothers Contracting Co. v.
American Hoist & Derrick Co.'
A 1986 Missouri Supreme Court decision has held that a plaintiff cannot
recover on a theory of strict tort liability if the only damage caused by the
defective product is to the product itself. 2 While this issue had not been
previously addressed in Missouri, earlier case law had intimated an opposite
result.3 This Note will question the soundness of the decision as to its effect
on subsequent strict tort liability cases. A short summary of the case and
the majority's reasoning will be discussed first.
Sharp Brothers Contracting Company brought suit against the manu-
facturer of a crane after the crane's counterweight broke and crushed the
crane's cab.4 The jury, on a strict tort liability theory,5 awarded Sharp Broth-
ers damages for loss of value of the crane and for loss of use of the crane. 6
The court of appeals affirmed the damages for loss of the crane but reversed
as to the damages for lost use. 7 The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer
to consider whether the cause should have been determined on a strict tort
1. 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
2. Under a strict tort liability action, the plaintiff has the burden of estab-
lishing (1) he was injured by the product, (2) he was injured because the product was
defective or otherwise unsafe for his use, and (3) the defect was in the product when
sold by the defendant manufacturer. See Winters v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 554
S.W.2d 565, 569-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MwNN. L. Rnv. 791, 840-41 (1966).
3. Strict liability would be appropriate "for personal injury, including death,
or property damage either to property other than the property sold or to the property
sold where it was rendered useless by some violent occurrence." Crowder v. Van-
dendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (en bane); see also City of Clayton v.
Grumman Emergency Prods., 576 F. Supp. 1122, 1125, (E.D. Mo. 1983); Gibson v.
Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
4. Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 902.
5. The petition had three counts: negligence theory, breach of warranty the-
ory, and strict tort liability theory. On motion by American Hoist (the manufacturer),
the trial court dismissed the negligence and warranty counts before trial. Id. at 903.
6. Sharp Brothers was awarded $631,000 in damages. Id. at 902.
7. The cause was remanded with orders to reduce the award by $263,578.54.
Id. at 902.
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liability theory.8 Relying on Dean Keeton, the court concluded that contract
law and contract restrictions on warranty liability should control.9 Therefore,
as a matter of policy, recovery under strict tort liability, should not be allowed
where the only damage is to the product sold. 0
Because Sharp Brothers resulted in damage to the defective product
only," the discussion in this Note will focus on "economic loss ' 12 and the
various approaches and factors used by other jurisdictions.
The majority of jurisdictions do not allow recovery under a strict tort
liability theory for pure economic loss. 3 In one of the leading cases, Seely
v. White Motor Company, 4 Seely purchased a truck that bounced violently
due to a defect. Because of alleged brake failure, the truck overturned when
Seely was turning a corner. 5 Seely was not personally injured, but the truck
8. Id.
9. "[T]he risk of harm to the product itself due to the condition of the
product would seem to be a type of risk that the parties to a purchase and sale
contract should be allowed to allocate pursuant to the terms of the contract." Id. at
902-03 (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OwN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON To Ts § 101(3) (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter PROSSER
& KETON].
10. On retransfer back to the court of appeals, Sharp Brothers was barred
by the four year statute of limitations on the warranty claim. However, it was found
that Sharp Brothers' petition did state a negligence claim, and the case was remanded.
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 714 S.W.2d 919, 922
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
11. The three primary types of losses resulting from a defective product are
personal injury, damage to property other than the defective product, and damage
to the defective product itself. Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp.
355, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
12. Economic loss is the reduction in value of the product because of inferior
quality and failure to work in the normal manner for which it was produced and
sold. Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966). There are two
categories of economic loss: direct and consequential. Direct loss is the cost to repair
or replace the damaged product and loss of bargain, and is arrived at by subtracting
the value of the defective product from the product's value if properly made. Con-
sequential loss, known as indirect loss, includes lost profits due to the buyer's inability
to make normal use of the defective product. Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor
Co., 98 N.J. 555, 566, 489 A.2d 660, 665 (1985) (citations omitted).
13. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
280, 285-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law); Morrow v. New Moon Homes,
Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 285-86 (Alaska 1976); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona
Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, -, 666 P.2d 544, 548 (1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 85, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (1982); Local Joint
Executive Bd., Culinary Workers Union Local 226 v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651
P.2d 637, 638 (1982).
14. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (en banc).
15. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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was damaged. 16 Action was brought against the manufacturer 17 seeking dam-
ages for the repair of the truck resulting from the accident and for damages
unrelated to the accident.' 8 Those damages unrelated to the accident included
payments previously made on the truck and lost profits due to Seely's ina-
bility to use his truck in the normal business manner.' 9 The lower court held
the manufacturer liable for breach of warranty and entered judgment for
Seely on the payments made and for lost profits. 20 The claim for repairs was
denied because the lower court found Seely had not proved the bouncing
caused the truck to overturn. 2'
The California Supreme Court upheld the manufacturer's liability for
breach of warranty by finding the purchase order warranted the truck to be
free from defects.22 Because the court concluded that Seely had relied on this
warranty,2 the statutory requirement had been met and it was immaterial
whether Seely was aware that the manufacturer, and not the dealer, was
making the warranty.2 The court disagreed with the contention that breach
of warranty had been replaced by strict tort liability.2Y While warranty laws
may have prevented deserved compensation for personal injury, the court
found they were written to serve the "needs of commercial transactions. ' 26
The manufacturer is allowed to determine the quality of product promised
and the quality he must deliver.27 The buyer is allowed to "shop around"
to find a product which meets his needs.2 Only if the manufacturer had
agreed that the product would satisfy the buyer's needs would the manufac-
16. Repair costs were $5,466.09. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at
19.
17. Action was also brought against the dealer, Southern Truck Sales. The
action against Southern was dismissed without prejudice during the trial. Id. at 12-
13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
18. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
19. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.




23. Reliance by Seely was evidenced by his continuous attempts to have the
defect cured. The warranty was evidenced by the manufacturer's acceptance of this
responsibility. Id.
24. Id. The statute requires that the warranty "induce the buyer to purchase
the goods, and.., the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." CAL. CoM. CODE
§ 2313 (West 1964) (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 1732).
25. Sales law was to govern the economic relationship between buyer and
seller while strict tort liability "was designed, not to undermine the warranty pro-
visions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern
the distinct problem of physical injuries." Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
15, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21, (1965) (en banc).
26. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
1987]
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turer be liable if the product did not meet the buyer's economic expectations. 29
Because Seely's truck was not free from defects as warranted, the court held
the manufacturer liable. 0
However, the court reasoned that had strict tort liability been applied,
the manufacturer would have been liable regardless of any agreement that
the truck would perform as Seely had expected. 31 Damages of unknown and
unlimited scope would result.32 Imposed liability would not consider what
representations were made by the manufacturer.3 3 The court feared that if
strict tort liability were applied in this case, the manufacturer would be liable
not only for the commercial loss suffered by Seely but for all business losses
of truck drivers whose trucks failed to meet their specific needs even though
the dealer was not aware of those needs. 34
While the court rejected the application of strict tort liability to alleviate
a buyer's frustrated economic expectations, 35 the court agreed it should be
extended to cover physical damage to the plaintiff's property as well as
physical injury.36 "Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury
that there is no reason for distinguishing them." '37
In Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc.,38 Santor brought an action
against the manufacturer, Karagheusian, for defective carpeting. 39 The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that Santor could recover on a breach of implied
warranty theory even though Santor's only damage was the cost of the car-
peting.40 In abandoning the privity requirement, the court found no reason
29. Id.
30. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
31. Id. Under a strict tort liability theory, liability cannot be disclaimed since
one of its purposes is to prevent a manufacturer from limiting his responsibility. Id.
at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (en banc)).
32. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
33. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
34. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
35. The court distinguished types of damage to the defective product. If the
product was defective and failed to match a buyer's economic expectations, there
would not be strict tort liability recovery. However, if an accident to the product
resulted from the defect, the court suggested strict tort liability recovery would be
appropriate. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
36. Because the trial court found no proof that the defect caused the accident,
strict tort liability recovery was denied. Id.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
39. After carpeting had been installed, Santor noticed a line running through
it. The dealer assured Santor the lines would "walk out." However, during continued
use, the defect increased. Id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307.
40. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310-11. "Loss of bargain" is the term applied by




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss4/7
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
to distinguish cases in which personal injury resulted from a defective product
from those in which the injury was a reduction in the product's value.4 1
Breach of implied warranty should apply regardless of the resulting injury
because the manufacturer put a defective product into the stream of com-
merce. 42
After holding that Santor could recover on a breach of implied warranty
theory, the court also said that recovery in strict tort liability would have
been possible. 43 By placing the product on the market, the manufacturer
represents that the product is safe for its intended use.44 This type of rep-
resentation is implied because the majority of consumers lack the knowledge
or opportunity to determine if a product is defective, and they must rely on
the skill and care of the manufacturer. 45 Strict tort liability ensures that
manufacturers bear the costs associated with putting a defective product on
the market, whether there is personal injury or "damage, either to the goods
sold or to other property."4
After the broad holding in Santor that economic losses were recoverable
under a strict tort liability theory,47 the same court has limited the decision
by introducing another factor-the commercial buyer as opposed to the or-
dinary consumer." In Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Company,49
a truck dealer brought an action against three commercial defendants to
recover damages resulting from defective transmissions. 0 Despite its ruling
in Santor, the court held that a commercial buyer could not recover for
economic losses under a strict tort liability theory.51 In making this deter-
41. Id. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309. The manufacturer argued the removal of the
privity requirement only applied to situations where personal injury resulted. Id. at
58, 207 A.2d at 308.
42. Id. at 59-60, 207 A.2d at 309.
43. Id. at 63-64, 207 A.2d at 311.
44. The court stated that "such representation must be regarded as implicit
in their presence on the market." Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311 (1965) (citing Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963) (en banc)).
45. Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
46. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
47. Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
48. In this Note, "commercial buyer" and "ordinary consumer" are given
their common meanings. A commercial buyer is one who purchases goods for use in
a business. An ordinary consumer is the "everyday" purchaser who buys goods for
the home, car, personal use, etc.
49. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
50. Spring Motors sought to recover from the manufacturer, dealer, and sup-
plier of transmissions the costs of towing, replacement parts for repairs, lost profits
resulting from cancelled truck leases, and the decrease in value of the trucks. Id. at
561, 564, 489 A.2d at 662, 664 (1985).
51. id. at 561, 489 A.2d at 663; see also Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United
Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying California law); Avenell
19871
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mination, the court applied the policies underlying strict tort liability to the
parties involved. 2
One policy consideration behind strict tort liability is equality of bar-
gaining positions." The court stated "[pL]erfect parity is not necessary to a
determination that parties have substantially equal bargaining positions,"
and therefore, Spring Motors was found to have had sufficient bargaining
power with Ford to have negotiated for installation of the desired transmis-
sions. 4
Allocation of risk is another policy consideration. The court determined
that Spring Motors was just as able to allocate the risk of loss as the defen-
dants were." The price Spring Motors paid for the trucks was considered in
light of the agreement that stated Ford was responsible only for repair or
replacement of parts. 6 If the risk of loss had been placed on Ford, Spring
Motors would have received a better bargain.57 Also, it would have caused
Ford to increase prices, which would have affected all consumers. 58 There-
fore, the allocation of risks as agreed to by the commercial parties would
better serve the public interest. 59 In general, the court concluded that the
Uniform Commercial Code is "[r]egarded as the exclusive source for ascer-
taining when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based
on intangible economic loss not attributable to physical injury to person or
harm to a tangible thing other than the defective product itself."' 0 While the
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 158-59, 324 N.E.2d 583, 588-89(1974). The court in Spring Motors indicated a commercial buyer could recover for
economic loss under a breach of warranty theory. Spring Motors, however, was barred
by the four year statute of limitations. Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co.,
98 N.J. 555, 562-66, 489 A.2d 660, 663-65 (1985).
52. Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 575-77, 489 A.2d at 670-71.
53. Id. at 575, 489 A.2d at 670.
54. Id. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671. Contra Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (en banc) ("law of warranty
is not limited to parties in a somewhat equal bargaining position"). See generally
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D.
Iowa 1973) (in an action to recover commercial loss, strict tort liability was not
applicable when parties of equal bargaining power negotiate a contract).
55. The court even suggested that Spring Motors, being a commercial buyer,
could be in a better position than the manufacturer to distribute the risk of loss into
the price of its products. Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555,
576, 489 A.2d 660, 671 (1985); see Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Ju-
risprudence, 66 CoLTJm. L. Rnv. 917, 952-58 (1966).
56. Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 576, 489 A.2d at 671.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671. The underlying U.C.C. policy is that parties
should be allowed to enter contracts of their choice; once an agreement is reached,
society has an interest in upholding the contract. Id. at 571, 489 A.2d at 668.
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majority in Seely v. White Motor Company did not question whether Seely
was a commercial buyer,61 the concurring opinion found Seely to be an
ordinary consumer. 62 Because Seely, as an ordinary consumer, did not assume
the risk of loss through equal bargaining, strict tort liability recovery under
the Santor rationale should have been allowed. 63
Another factor courts consider is how the damage to the product itself
occurred. Defects of quality are evidenced by internal deterioration or break-
down and are called economic losses while property damage is a loss resulting
from a violent accident. 64 This distinction is drawn by looking at the nature
of the defect, the type of risk that was imposed, and how the injury arose.6
In Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,6 action was brought against
Nobility to recover the economic loss that resulted from defects in a mobile
home. While the trial court found the mobile home was defective in its
workmanship and materials, it did not find that these defects made the mobile
home unreasonably dangerous to Shivers or his property.67 The court relied
on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) 68 in holding that
Shivers could not recover his economic losses under a strict tort liability
61. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965) (en banc) ("Plaintiff purchased the truck for use in his business;" Seely sought
lost profits "because he was unable to make normal use of the truck"). Id. at 12-
13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
62. "Plaintiff was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for hauling and
not a fleet-owner who bought trucks regularly in the course of his business." Id. at
28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring
and dissenting).
64. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1169 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)).
65. Id. at 1173.
66. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
67. Id. at 78.
68. Section 402A reads:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTAT MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
19871
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theory.6 9 The court found that "physical harm" resulting from an unrea-
sonably dangerous defect as required by the Restatement was not the same
as "economic loss."P70
Although strict tort liability was also denied in Northern Power & En-
gineering Corporation v. Caterpillar Tractor Company,7' the court stated
that "when a defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous to
persons or other property, and loss occurs as a result of that danger, strict
liability in tort is an appropriate remedy even though the damage is confined
to the product itself." 72 Northern sought recovery when a diesel powered
electric generator was damaged due to engine failure. 73 Since there was no
evidence that the oil leak that caused overheating posed a danger to persons
or other property, the loss was purely economic. 74
Recovery under strict tort liability was allowed in Pennsylvania Glass
Sand Corporation v. Caterpillar Tractor Company.75 Pennsylvania Glass Sand
(PGS) brought suit to recover repair and replacement costs from the man-
ufacturer when a front-end loader caught fire due to a defect. 76 Caterpillar,
the manufacturer, asserted the loss was economic and therefore not recov-
erable under a strict tort liability theory.7 7 PGS, on the other hand, alleged
there was no economic loss, but rather physical injury to its property due
to a violent occurrence. 78 The court, in looking at the nature of the defect
69. Shivers' economic loss was $8,750 - the mobile home's reasonable market
value less its purchase price. Although Shivers could not recover these losses under
a strict tort liability theory, the court held he could recover under a breach of warranty
theory. Nobility, 557 S.W.2d at 78.
70. Id. at 80; see also Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1976) (applying Pennsylvania law, filmmaker denied strict tort liability re-
covery where scratched film found not to be unreasonably dangerous).
71. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
72. Plaintiff must show that (1) the loss resulted from the dangerous defect
and (2) the loss occurred under a dangerous circumstance. Id. at 329.
73. Id. at 325.
74. Id. at 329-30; cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d
69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (strict tort liability recovery denied because crack in grain
storage tank was economic loss, but court held that when a product is sold in a
defective condition which renders it unreasonably dangerous to user or property,
strict tort liability was applicable).
75. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Russell
v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978) (damage to truck resulting
from fractured axle recoverable under strict tort liability because defect dangerous to
persons and property).
76. PGS alleged the front-end loader was defective because it was not equipped
with a fire suppression system or with adequate warnings of action to take if a fire
resulted. Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d at 1166.
77. Caterpillar also asserted the warranty limited PGS's recovery to replace-
ment of defective parts, and it specifically excluded economic loss recovery. Id. at
1167.
78. Only the front-end loader (the defective product) was damaged in the fire.
[Vol. 52
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and the type of risk it imposed, held the damage was physical injury and
recoverable under a strict tort liability action. 9 The manufacturer has a duty
to "produce safe items, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the
hazard is on people, other property, or the product itself."80
In a case virtually identical to Sharp Brothers, John R. Dudley Con-
struction, Inc. v. Dott Manufacturing Co., recovery was allowed under a
strict tort liability theory even though only the crane was damaged."1 Dudley
Construction had purchased a used crane "as is. ' ' s2 While the crane was
being operated in its normal capacity, the turntable bolts broke, causing the
crane's superstructure, containing the engine and cab, to crash to the ground."3
In addressing the question of whether strict tort liability recovery should be
allowed, the court reasoned that if the crane's load "or other property had
been injured or damaged by the crane's collapse, such damage would have
been recoverable.' "8 The court found no logical reason to distinguish between
damage to other property and damage to the product itself."- The damage
in either case would still be the result of the manufacturer's tortious conduct
in supplying a crane that was unreasonably dangerous because of the pos-
sibility of collapse due to defective bolts.8 6 An action for strict tort liability
"seeks to provide a remedy for an individual injured because of another's
violation of an obligation imposed not by contract, but by law."
8 s7
Under its admiralty jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court, in
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., held there is no strict
tort liability recovery when the defect results only in economic loss.88 Char-
79. The nature of the defect resulted in a fire which is considered a sudden
and dangerous occurrence, and the design defect constituted a safety hazard to people
and property. Id. at 1174-75.
80. Id. at 1173. Because the manufacturer has this duty, buyers are not re-
quired to bargain for a safe product. The court pointed out PGS did not assert a
warranty claim to protect its benefit of the bargain, but rather, sought to recover for
a hazardous defect. Id. at 1175.
81. 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979).
82. Id. at 370, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 513. The court found no evidence that the
"as is" and disclaimer clauses were intended to exclude claims of physical injury to
the product under a strict tort liability theory. Id. at 375, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
83. Id. at 370, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
84. Id. at 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 513 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514. The court pointed out that it's declining
to distinguish between damage to other property and damage to the defective product
did not mean that it had to allow strict tort liability recovery against the manufacturer
where the plaintiff had suffered economic loss. Id. at 372, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
86. Id. at 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
87. Id. at 371-72, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (quoting Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip.
Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1978)).
88. 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2305 (1986). Although East River and Sharp Brothers
reach the same result, it should be noted that Sharp Brothers was decided first. While
Sharp Brothers obviously could not have relied on East River, the Missouri Supreme
Court would not have been bound by the East River decision because the U.S.
Supreme Court was exercising its admiralty jurisdiction.
9691987]
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terers of supertankers sought recovery from Delaval, the manufacturer and
installer of turbines, when an internal ring disintegrated and caused additional
damage to the turbine. 9 In affirming the district court's granting of summary
judgment for Delaval, the court of appelas held strict tort liability was not
applicable when the defect does not create an unreasonable risk of harm to
persons or other property. 90 Because the court of appeals found the damage
to the turbine to be gradual deterioration, warranty law controlled. 91
In affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court focused on the
ability of the commercial buyer to protect itselfY2 In distinguishing economic
loss from personal injury, the Court stated "the commercial user stands to
lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find
that the product does not meet their needs, or, as in this case, experiences
increased costs in performing a service." 93 The Court went on to say contract
law should govern because the parties, having relatively equal bargaining
power, could negotiate the terms of their agreement and there was "no reason
to intrude into the parties' allocation of risk." 94
The concept of strict tort liability was first embraced by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corporation.95 Morrow pur-
chased a defective gas stove that resulted in a fire which destroyed the per-
sonal property in his home.96 The court held the manufacturer had impliedly
warranted the reasonable safety and fitness of the stove and was therefore
liable despite lack of privity between Morrow and the manufacturer. 97
In Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company,98 the warranty
language requirement in Morrow was eliminated by adopting Section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts (Second) which recognized strict tort liability.99
The court's basis for adopting strict tort liability was that it would "insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products [were] borne by
89. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2296-97.
90. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 909-10 (3d
Cir. 1985) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
91. Delaval Turbine, 752 F.2d at 909.
92. The Court stated: "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no
duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product
from injuring itself." East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302.
93. Id. at 2303.
94. Id. Under the contract the charterers agreed to take the ships "as is" and
to maintain, repair, and insure the ships. Id. at 2304.
95. 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
96. Id. at 50.
97. Id. at 55.
98. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
99. See supra note 68 for text of Section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who [were] powerless to protect themselves."' 10
In Crowder v. Vandendeale,'0' action was brought against a home con-
tractor to recover for foundation cracks resulting from settling of the house.
The court concluded that an implied warranty theory was appropriate for
deterioration damages'02 and reasoned that a failure to meet the desired
standard of quality should be governed by the agreement of the parties. 03
The court suggested, however, that should there be personal injury or prop-
erty damage "either to property other than the property sold or to the
property sold where it was rendered useless by some violent occurrence,"
then strict tort liability would be appropriate."°4
Subsequent Missouri cases have relied on the court's suggested appli-
cation of strict tort liability where there had only been damage to the defective
product and have determined what constituted a violent occurrence. In Gib-
son v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc.,"°5 Gibson sought to recover damages that
resulted when the car's heater core ruptured, permitting the coolant to escape
and irreparably damaging the engine."4 Based on Crowder, the court denied
recovery in strict tort liability because the damage had not resulted from a
violent occurrence. 1" Similarly, the court denied recovery in strict tort liability
where the City of Clayton brought an action to recover for a cracked foun-
dation on a fire truck.' 0 Based on the city's allegations in its complaint, the
court concluded the damage was not the result of a violent occurrence."09
The court again denied strict tort liability recovery in Clevenger & Wright
Company v. A.0. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. 10 Clevenger sought to
100. Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (en banc)).
101. 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
102. Crowder's claim was dismissed, however, because the court limited the
implied warranty theory to first purchasers of a home; Crowder was the second
purchaser. Id. at 880, 884.
103. In the absence of an express agreement, an implied warranty would be
imposed. Id. at 882. Missouri has continued to deny strict tort liability recovery where
there has been only economic loss. See Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29,
31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (if economic loss only, plaintiff is restricted to remedies
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code).
104. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 881.
105. 608 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
106. Id. at 472.
107. The car, purchased from Reliable Chevrolet, was 17 to 18 months old
and had been driven over 23,000 miles, leading the court to conclude such a rupture
was not violent. It was also noted that Gibson could not recover under warranty
because it had expired. Id. at 472, 474.
108. City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Prods., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D.
Mo. 1983) (applying Missouri law).
109. The complaint stated plaintiffs had discovered the cracked foundation
after noticing the "lean in the profile of the truck." Id. at 1126.
110. 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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recover for damages resulting from a tornado hitting his grain storage silo.'"
Though this was a "violent occurrence," the court stated the term was to
be applied only to internal defects or .unreasonably dangerous products as
contemplated by Section 402A.1 2
While the holding and rationale of the court may be appropriate for the
Sharp Brothers' situation, will it be appropriate in the case of an ordinary
consumer?
The court in Sharp Brothers relied on Dean Keeton in stating that strict
tort liability recovery will be denied when the only damage caused by the
defect is to the product sold."' However, the material by Keeton quoted in
the decision" 4 focuses on commercial parties. Keeton suggests that the con-
tract language should be controlling when the parties allocate the risk of
injury."5 "[T]he risk of harm to the product itself due to the condition of
the product would seem to be a type of risk that the parties to a purchase
and sale contract should be allowed to allocate pursuant to the terms of the
contract." 116 Dean Keeton went on to say that this was especially true with
regard to transactions dealing with commercial or industrial products.1 7
One of the reasons Missouri adopted strict tort liability in Keener v.
Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company was to provide protection for or-
dinary consumers "who are powerless to protect themselves." ' S Ordinary
consumers are "powerless" because there is inequality in the bargaining
process. There is not any negotiating as to who will bear the risk of harm.
There is not a personalized contract to then allocate the terms agreed to. If
the consumer wants the product, he buys it along with whatever warranties
or disclaimers the manufacturer has included.
Because Sharp Brothers dealt with two commercial parties on an equal
footing who could bargain and negotiate a contract for the sale of the crane," 9
the court's reliance on Keeton is well placed. While parties should be free
to enter into contracts of their choice, they should also be bound by them. 2"
However, as mentioned above, while ordinary consumers may voluntarily
111. Id. at 907.
112. Id. at 909.
113. Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 903.
114. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 101(3) (footnotes omitted).
115. Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 903 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
9, § 101(3) (footnotes omitted)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969) (quot-
ing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (en banc)).
119. Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 903.
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enter into a contract, it is not a contract of their choice. The ordinary
consumer is powerless, and strict tort liability should protect him as it was
adopted to do.
Another policy reason behind strict tort liability as stated in Keener is
one of risk-spreading.12' The theory is that the manufacturer is in a better
position to absorb the costs associated with a product causing injury than is
a consumer. 122 The manufacturer insures against the risk of injury, and this
cost is distributed among all of its consumers through increased prices.' 21
By rejecting strict tort liability recovery in Sharp Brothers, the policy
reason of risk spreading has not been subverted. The parties are equally
capable of distributing the loss as a cost of doing business. But if strict tort
liability is rejected in the case of an ordinary consumer, the cost is borne
completely by the consumer. As stated in Keener, "[t]he purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers.... ."24
The majority in Sharp Brothers limits "injuries" to personal injury or
injury to the plaintiffs other property.'2 This limitation is questionable be-
cause a defect may result in injury to the product itself. If strict tort liability
is to insure that manufacturers bear the cost of injury caused by placing a
defective product into the marketplace, why should that liability be limited?
Manufacturers have a duty to produce a safe product,'26 and by putting the
product into the marketplace, they represent it as being safe. 27 If harm
results, the manufacturer has breached its duty.
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) seems to support
application of strict tort liability even when there is only physical damage to
the defective product itself. It provides for strict tort liability of a manufac-
turer when a product is sold "in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or his property" that results in physical
harm. 128
The first condition in Section 402A insures that economic losses are not
recoverable in strict tort liability. By requiring an unreasonably dangerous
121. See Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364.
122. Id.
123. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (en banc).
124. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969) (quot-
ing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) (en banc)).
125. See Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 903.
126. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1173 (3d Cir. 1981).
127. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305,
311 (1965).
128. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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defect, loss of bargain and deterioration claims are eliminated. The majority
in Sharp Brothers appears to have ignored this condition. It is concerned
that determining whether a loss was the result of an "accident" (and thus a
"violent occurrence" or an unreasonably dangerous defect) would be a dif-
ficult and irrelevant issue . 2 9 Its basis for finding the issue irrelevant rests in
the contract context involving allocation of risk between the parties, which
as discussed earlier, should not be applied to the ordinary consumer. As for
it being a difficult issue, it seems to be a question of fact for the jury to
determine, and juries must often face difficult determinations.
The second condition is that physical harm must result from the unrea-
sonably dangerous defect. While this harm may be personal injury, it also
includes the consumer's property. It is not stated that the harm must be to
the consumer's "other property." It seems that the defective product falls
within the category of "his property," as the term is used by the Restatement
and therefore, if physical harm occurs solely to the defective product, strict
tort liability recovery should be allowed.
Determining whether economic loss is recoverable under a strict tort
liability theory is addressed in as many different ways as there are different
results. The majority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, hold that strict tort
liability is not applicable when there is pure economic loss. However, some
courts distinguish between economic loss and physical harm, even though in
both cases the damage is to the defective product only. If the damage results
from a violent occurrence or unreasonably dangerous defect rather than
deterioration, then there is physical harm and strict tort liability recovery is
allowed.
Other courts look to the parties involved in the transaction. With com-
mercial parties negotiating on equal footing, recovery under strict tort liability
is not allowed because the parties are able to allocate the risks and should
be bound by the contract terms.
While the decision in Sharp Brothers clarifies one issue in Missouri law,
it raises another question. The holding affirms prior case law that rejects the
application of strict tort liability where there is pure economic loss. The
decision also holds that dicta in Crowder, suggesting strict tort liability re-
covery would be allowed if the defect resulted in a violent occurrence, is not
to be followed. The question now raised, however, is whether the holding
in Sharp Brothers applies to all consumers or only to commercial buyers.
While the decision broadly rejects strict tort liability recovery where there is
only economic loss (whether deterioration or physical harm), the court's
reasoning focuses on commercial parties.
As discussed above, the rejection of strict tort liability where there is
only economic loss, whether deterioration or physical harm, does not defeat
129. Sharp Bros., 703 S.W.2d at 903.
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the policies of strict tort liability when commercial parties are involved.
However, with the ordinary consumer, the two main policy considerations
relied on in Keener are subverted. First, the ordinary consumer cannot ne-
gotiate with the manufacturer to allocate the risks. The contract agreed on
is the one supplied by the manufacturer. Also, the ordinary consumer is not
in a position to distribute the cost of risk of injury, but must bear the entire
cost of the loss. While deterioration and quality defects have a direct rela-
tionship to the price paid and the consumer "gets what he paid for," a defect
that causes physical harm is the result of the manufacturer's breach of duty
to produce a safe product, and this cost should not be placed on the ordinary
consumer.
It is now clear in Missouri that commercial parties will not be able to
recover under a strict tort liability theory. It remains to be determined,
however, whether Sharp Brothers will be applied to ordinary consumers or
whether an exception will be carved out to allow strict tort liability recovery
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